“Referring to concepts such as the liberal order framework and state formation, discuss the rise of the modern state in Canada”
Ian McKay, in “The Liberal Order Framework: A
Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History” considers liberalism as a
means for analyzing the “historically specific project of rule” that formed in
Canada. [1] He argues that
Canada was “simultaneously an extensive projection
of liberal rule and an intensive process
of subjectification.”[2] McKay suggests that
liberalism be approached from a neo-Marxist framework, using class as a site
for analyzing other points of intersection and oppression.[3] However, he notes
the presence of histories of women and ethnic minorities, including Indigenous
people, suggesting that these “autonomous subaltern histories” can be connected
using a “liberal-order ‘bridge” that considers how they have been
conceptualized as Others, apart from the liberal project.[4] Liberalism is an
important but insufficient framework for understanding the struggles of these
“Others” in relation to nation-building processes in Canada. Instead, the
colonial element of nation-building must be placed at the forefront as a lens
through which to analyze other social and political relations, as an element
that underpinned liberalism, which itself took shape on the Canadian stage in
conjunction with increasingly nuanced and oppressive ideologies about race and
sex. This paper will therefore detail the expansion of a white settler state,
premised on a colonial, liberal, patriarchal framework. Such a process was
neither totalizing nor uniformly coercive, neither neutral nor inevitable. It
appears to have been twofold, entailing the spread of infrastructure and the
spread of ideology.
The language used to describe state formation
processes is important, as it has the potential to portray state building as
hegemonic and naturalized, or contested. To start, “rising” is not an
appropriate word to describe state formation, as it implies a sense of inevitability
and obscures the violence and power relations behind this process. Instead,
state formation was a re-formation, replacing previous structures. “Modern” is
a nebulous concept, linked to technology, order, and rationality. It is
generally associated with colonial rather than indigenous states and societies.
Linked with masculine and colonial power, valuing “modernity” is a rhetorical
means of buttressing an order based on white, male rule. For the purposes of
this paper, a definition of the state would consider not merely infrastructure,
but values, comprising government and its institutions as well as the values
that normalized the use of these institutions; it is a contested concept,
rather than a stable entity. Defining liberalism is a complex matter, as it is often
contradictory and fluid, with many shifting components. Tina Loo’s definition
partly encapsulates it by noting the link of liberalism and capitalism; she
positions liberalism as “a political philosophy whose emergence in the
eighteenth century not only paralleled the growth of capitalism, but shaped and
was shaped by it.” [5] Keith Smith refers to it as “a matrix of flexible
formations,” noting that liberalism varies significantly in theory and in
practice.[6] While
on one level it is a discourse, liberalism also has a visible material impact.[7]
Liberalism is thus a prescriptive and hegemonic theory of social organization
that conflates self-interest with state interest. Cecilia Morgan notes that
“public” is a mutable and gendered concept.[8] For
clarity, I am putting “public” in quotation marks to illustrate this
contestation, although this is not reliably visible in the historiography. As
this paper will show, the notion of “public” is an integral component of state
formation, reflecting a complex nexus of liberal and republican values.
McKay defines a
liberal order as “one that encourages and seeks to extend across time and space
a belief in the epistemological and ontological primacy of the category ‘individual.’” [9]
This interweaves in complex ways with the centrality of “public” as a category,
as which was derived from a selective subset of individuals, privileged through
the formation of classist, racist, and patriarchal norms. McKay situates a
“Canadian liberal revolution” in the late nineteenth century.[10] Notably,
however, this coincides with the prominence of increasingly republican values
such as public education, discourse, space, and order. This collision of values
is not, however, incompatible with McKay’s analysis, as he notes that ideological
compromises and “bargaining with hegemony” produced a hybrid specific to Canada
that enabled the persistence of a liberal order.[11]
McKay
argues that Canada is “essentially a liberal empire, not a nation, and not a
democratic state.”[12]
His use of the word “empire” presents this as an imposition, rather than a
project of mutual creation. This provokes a number of questions, taken up in a
variety of ways by the historians whose work underpins this paper. For whom,
and in what situations, was this a common sense, totalizing philosophy? How
cohesive was this project? How hegemonic? The liberal order framework is useful
but insufficient for explaining the expansion of the state structure that
emerged in Canada, as it acknowledges but does not emphasize the critical role
of colonialism. The premise of equality in liberalism is a false premise, of
course, when applied in a colonial context. Smith notes this as well, arguing
that liberalism was a “means of, and justification for, colonialism.”[13]
The years prior to Confederation, particularly
surrounding the Rebellions of 1837 and 1838 in Upper and Lower Canada, were a
key period for the formation of processes and institutions of governance. This
formation centered on tensions of local and central, or “court” and “country”
in framing the relationships and power dynamics of a heterogeneous settler
state with complex social and political ties to Britain and the United States.
As Gordon Stewart outlines, Canadian state development created a “peculiarly
hybrid political culture” drawing from elements of both these nations. [14] A tension
between central “court” and local “country” politics transferred from Britain
to Canada and informed fledgling political parties. Stewart argues that
Canada’s political formation was not a hybrid of “court” and “country” but had
a more extreme “court” orientation encoded in the 1791 constitution.[15] “Country,” in
this context, was a powerful rhetorical weapon for reformers, as it conjured
images of the weaker executive orientation of the United States.[16]
Stewart situates political formation in Canada as
taking place primarily from the 1790s to the 1840s; [17] it is, however,
notable that this analysis focuses on central Canada, rather than the north and
west where the implementation of political processes and infrastructure in a
European model took place later. Rather than entering its denouement in the
1840s, political formation continued, albeit on a more diffuse level, through
the early twentieth century. Stewart argues that Confederation was a means of
giving the government stability, which had been a challenge given the absence
of a colonial ruling class;[18] however, state
formation in Canada instead rested on the assumption that the ruling class
would be colonial, rather than Indigenous. Patronage was a social and political
phenomenon that was important for both the government and reformers, as it
enabled a rise in party politics and served as a stabilizing force.[19] An attitude of
localism, pervasive due to nineteenth century economics, demographics, and
communications, became entrenched through patronage,[20] which in turn
entrenched and perpetuated a patriarchal colonialist system. Stewart notes that
reformers did not aim to reduce executive power but to reduce it, opening
participation and patronage to a wider base.[21] While Stewart
does not verbalize such an argument, it is possible to derive from his work
that patronage stabilized a self-serving system of liberal nation building,
premised on patriarchal, colonialist values, in which even reformers resembled
the ruling class.
The mechanisms of liberalism and the interplay of
local and central state forces are apparent in several studies of Lower Canada.
Jack Little argues in State and Society
in Transition that law courts were not imposed on the Eastern townships, as
its residents desired this infrastructure to resolve civil matters, although
they preferred to manage social disorder in their local communities. [22] Little repeatedly
emphasizes the “entrenched sense of localism” in the Eastern Townships, where
communities desired a municipal system to reduce social and economic isolation
but insisted that this be on their own terms.[23] He illustrates this
persisting interplay of local and central power in a successive analysis of
school acts; ultimately, despite restructuring that produced some extent of
centralization, the local school persisted as a vital social institution.[24] In The Patriots and the People, Allan Greer
identifies the parish as a site for “local self-management,” positioning
parishes as potentially more important than state legal institutions, and partly
reflecting the limited reach of the British colonial state in rural areas.[25] Donald Fyson argues
that the emergence of a liberal state in Lower Canada was continuous and fluid,
rather than occurring through a series of ruptures in French-English relations.[26] Like Little and Greer,
he highlights the interplay of local power and central authority, arguing that
rural areas did not uniformly reject state legal infrastructure although they
preferred local legal independence.[27] Even where the elite
implemented a system, it was used more broadly by local people, and was not a
direct means of oppression.[28] Legal infrastructure
in this area ostensibly served to protect private property and public order.[29]
In Upper Canada, Bruce Curtis outlines an ongoing
tension between local and central factors in the administration of education, a
struggle that was entangled with the implementation of responsible government,
as reformers were concerned that, without responsible government, centralized
education would operate as a form of imperialism. [30] Curtis notes that
responsible government was a “notoriously vague” concept, with definitions
varying between moderates and radicals.[31] From a reformer
perspective, responsible government could be a potential counterbalance to the
centralized power of the executive.
Jeffrey
McNairn approaches state formation from a different standpoint, considering the
workings of a “deliberative democracy,” in which the exchange of ideas took
place in the public sphere.[32]
Voluntary associations, overwhelmingly
male, acted as miniature republics and thus defined the “public.” For instance,
Masonic lodges were a site for expressing liberal values, and thus were sites
of male reasoning that “embodied the liberalism of the period.”[33]
McNairn argues that a “government based on public opinion was a prerequisite
for state formation,” yet the state formed along liberal lines, with a “public”
opinion that emphasized privacy and individualism.[34]
This illustrates a tension between liberalism and republicanism that dovetails
yet contrasts with Morgan’s analysis of religion and public life. According to
Morgan, “separate spheres” is a powerful yet imperfect conceptual framework, as
the public and private spheres were blurred and interdependent, and “the
social” was neither binary nor voluntary, but a space infused with power
relations.[35]
Stewart, similarly, notes that political parties were social institutions as
well as political ones.[36]
Curtis’s
analysis of the Educational State is particularly illustrative of a potential
analysis drawing from the liberal order framework, although, of course,
Curtis’s work predated McKay’s by twelve years. Curtis argues that the
construction of the Educational State was “accomplished only through the
destruction of a prior educational organization and the marginalization of the
structure of educational possibilities it presented. Education was certainly not synonymous with state schooling…that we often equate the two today is another
accomplishment of this Educational State.”[37]
The same could be said for liberalism; as McKay argues, it was not a neutral or
inevitable growth, and as Curtis notes, the debate over education reflects a
larger debate about the state more broadly.[38]
Curtis discusses the social contradiction in creating a system based on
compulsion while treating individual subjectivity as a fundamental principle;[39]
this seems to be a central paradox of liberalism, emphasizing public discourse
and common good alongside private property and individualism. Curtis’s
Educational State, like the liberal state more broadly, was a self-serving,
paradoxical system.[40]
The extent to which state formation was imposed upon
the settler population is a matter of debate in the historiography, notably
between Little and Curtis. Little argues that the state did not impose
infrastructure on the community. He notes that “state” and “community” were
both fluid concepts, focusing on state formation at the local level to consider
the role of the community in shaping the state. [41] In
the heterogeneous Eastern Townships, a “profound sense of localism” gave state
institutions popular legitimacy.[42] Curtis,
on the other hand, sees the Educational State as more of an imposition, “part
of a conscious state policy.”[43] What
these divergent viewpoints miss, however, is the extent to which white settler
society was itself an imposition upon an Indigenous population, even an
itinerant one.
While this historiography on Upper and Lower Canada
is not, excepting Morgan’s work, explicitly focused on gender relations, one
can nonetheless see that “state” and “society” are both implicitly gendered
male. It is evident that, in Lower Canada, women were not generally perceived
as political actors. The “protection” of women through repealing women’s
franchise in 1834 positioned women as non-citizens, [44] and women’s
political participation could even be a source of ridicule. Little, for
example, recounts that for men in the Eastern Townships, women making petitions
was a source of amusement rather than a serious political statement.[45] State
formation in this era was largely an exclusive rather than an inclusive
project, debating the role and configuration of a “responsible government” that
was, in any manifestation, largely elite and colonial in its character.
Much
of the historiography obscures the “settler” aspect of the Canadian state in
debating the nuances of its formation, and the extent to which it was imposed.
Even in situations where settlers supported expanding state infrastructure,
this was still the expansion of a colonial framework over a land that
settlers—and often historians—presumed to be empty and available by discounting
Aboriginal people’s land use practices. Some historiography of Upper and Lower
Canada neglects to note that Indigenous state structures in this area predated
European settlement, an element that significantly complicates any model of a
Canadian state.[46]
Nineteenth-century
public debate concerning state formation emphasized a need for rationality,
which was linked to manliness and whiteness in a way that excluded women and
infantilized First Nations people.[47]
While the “state” was not necessarily imposed on the “society” in a model where
both are conceptualized as largely white, male entities, this situation becomes
considerably more complex when foregrounding the colonial elements of state
formation. Curtis metaphorically conceptualizes the role of public schools in
Upper Canada as “outposts in the moral wilderness” and a civilizing force among
the settler population.[48]
This usefully highlights one complex role of the expansion of infrastructure in
“frontier” areas.
Through an analysis of western and northern parts of
Canada, one can see how state formation took place beyond the creation of a particular
form of government. In these areas, state structures and values became
entrenched through a convergence of liberalism, colonialism, and paternalism,
implementing infrastructures that reflected a particular vision and version of
modernity. Histories of the law, the environment, and the reorganization of
space illustrate how the regulatory elements of the state had uneven impacts
and were hegemonic, though not totalizing. This reorganization, premised upon
ideas of scientific knowledge, was a means for Europeans to manifest their goal
of mastery over the environment, which, in a colonial view, included Indigenous
people alongside animals and waterways. [49]
Perry
argues that colonial British Columbia illustrates a “specific moment in state
formation” entailing, in part, the efforts of a small and diverse settler
population to assert their whiteness.[50]
This was intensive and expansive though not, as other historians have noted,
totalizing or cohesive. Colonial expansion, as Perry shows, operated on many levels:
public health initiatives in response to smallpox epidemics served as a means
of containing Aboriginal people, banning them from urban spaces.[51]
Vital statistics enabled colonial authorities to measure and regulate marriage,
which was a means of instituting state values.[52]
The family more broadly became a state institution, bolstered by land and
immigration laws that shaped the character of colonial society according to
constructions of gender, race, and class.[53]
Ideologically, these initiatives reflected a belief in the importance of
private property — this is apparent in the absence of free land grants and land
allocations that prioritized families.[54]
The family, it seems, transcended constructions of public and private: it was a
public institution to the extent that it embodied state values and was
regulated by state infrastructure, yet colonists treated certain family affairs
as private matters. For instance, the colonial state was often reluctant to
intervene in incidents of spousal violence.[55]
Little and Fyson have both argued that settler
society in Quebec and Lower Canada made use of legal infrastructure, on their
own terms. This pattern is also apparent in the colonization of British
Columbia, where settlers made use of legal courts to enable economic
development. [56] Loo situates law as
a socially constructed element of a liberal order that was inextricable from
the market economy.[57] Liberalism, she
argues, naturalized the use of courts as the exclusive venue for rational
conflict resolution.[58] As most settler
relationships were economic, the law was largely a means of securing property
and, thus, social stability.[59]
The
use of the law to secure property and social stability was not an uncontested
process; the Grouse Creek War, for instance, showed a conflict of local and
customary versus colonial and formal law.[60]
As Loo argues, “the existence of multiple meanings of law placed limits on its
authority.”[61]
McKay notes that the liberal order framework often focuses on “individuals” in
the abstract,[62]
but it is important to remember that the people here not a nebulous force, and
ideology is not an agent. The limits of legal authority due to individual
decisions are illustrated in the interplay of judge Matthew Begbie’s actions
and the “public” response to it. Begbie, in this case, represented a colonial
and formal construction of the law, in contrast to the local and customary law
represented by miners in a series of legal cases.[63]
Among Begbie’s controversial decisions was overriding a jury’s verdict,
prompting concern surrounding legal administration in the colony.[64]
Underpinning Begbie’s actions was his failure to recognize the law as socially
constructed, assuming instead that human behaviour would be universally
rational.[65] McNairn
refers to the “public man” as a “universal, impartial figure.”[66]
The example of Begbie makes it evident that this was a problematic ideal. Legal
cases thus show the complexities and contradictions in ideologies that were
premised upon abstractions, and the result for non-abstract individuals who
were valorized or excluded by them.
McKay suggests using the history of reserves to
consider the liberal revolution in Canada, seeing federal policy concerning
Aboriginal peoples as “a fulfillment of liberal norms, which required the
subordination of alternatives.” [67] In Keith Smith’s
analysis of this subject, it becomes apparent that liberalism was “an
exclusionary rather than inclusionary force” that enabled the dispossession of
Indigenous peoples.[68] Through this
dispossession, liberalism stressed the importance not of freedom and equality,
but the defense of private property and the individuals who held it.[69] While unevenly
applied, liberal paradigms created knowledge to normalize power relations through
a web of surveillance and data collection to control Indigenous territories and
resources, and the individual mobility of Indigenous people.[70] In a setting
where private property was a “public” value, Indigenous people became, to
borrow the words of Judith Raftery, “not part of the public.”[71] The textures of
this can be seen in greater detail by examining conservation efforts that
blended together the interests of business and industry with those of the state
and scientists, at the expense of Indigenous Canadians.
Carl Berger has asserted that the organization of
science locally, nationally, and internationally resembled the political
structures of provincialism and centralization. [72] Natural
science and conservation, in this sense, mirrored and interacted with the
state, even when it was not as explicitly a component of state formation. In States of Nature, Loo considers the
legal regime for wildlife regulation, untangling its ideological influences.
Loo shows how Progressivism and scientific management interacted with
anti-modern sentiments, informing treatments of wildlife. Private individuals,
independent from, yet interacting with, the state, held an important role in
conservation efforts.[73]
Provincial-federal relations operated in a complex patchwork, reflecting a
variety of ideologies and traditions.[74] Conservation
shifted from a fragmented and local approach in the late nineteenth century to
a scientific, structured intervention in the twentieth century.[75] Efforts to
avoid the privatization of wildlife were underpinned by a hidden goal of
restricting access to a narrow and privileged “public.”[76] This idea of
a restricted “public” also comes through in Loo’s consideration of government
initiatives in northern Canada to create a “national commons.” The forcible
relocation of Aboriginal people as part of this caribou conservation effort
shows the restrictive nature of these “commons.”[77] Loo’s broad
study is thus illustrative of the multiple threads linking the histories of the
environment and state formation.
Conservation efforts intersected with “modern”
infrastructure, in some cases drawing First Nations into a position of
dependence. For instance, Matthew Evenden describes how in 1913, at Hell’s Gate
in the Fraser River, rockslides triggered by railway construction had a
dramatic impact on salmon spawning, prompting scientific debate and efforts to
aid the spawning fish. [78] This
scientific effort drew, in an incomplete fashion, from Coast Salish knowledge
of the area to combine Indigenous methods of manipulating the fish with
Euro-Canadian scientific authority. Ultimately, despite their use of Coast
Salish knowledge of Hells Gate, scientists echoed a common twentieth century
concern of Aboriginal mismanagement of resources, restricting Coast Salish
fishing that they believed would undermine efforts to rescue the fish. This had
a long-term impact of fish shortages, increasing economic dependence on
government aid.[79] Concerning
the damming of rivers in what he refers to as “hydraulic imperialism,” Evenden
argues that the fish versus power debate was influential for science, with the
debate and science shaping one another.[80] The
debate gave authority and privileged access to biological knowledge, building a
division between experts and amateurs, and requiring approval by scientists for
further development. This also shows how a new institutional framework emerged
for a bidirectional relationship between politics and science.[81]
John
Sandlos links conservation with colonialism and social control, arguing that
the federal government claimed authority over natural areas, such as Wood
Buffalo National Park, on the premise such areas being “pristine.”[82]
The bureaucracy imposed by the state denied First Nations sovereignty over
their traditional territories and colonized First Nations knowledge,
privileging “modern” colonial structures and land uses.[83]
In a colonial interpretation, conservation was a matter of restricting which humans could have access to
particular spaces on the premise of science and modernity.[84]
State officials emphasized responsibility and rationality in manipulating the
landscape, presenting these concepts as a contrast to First Nations practices.[85]
Sandlos sees this dispossession as an intentionally integral element of
conservation programs, which operated with a conscious goal of denying First
Nations sovereignty and changing their lifestyles as a component of
domesticating the northern frontier.[86]
The dispossession of First Nations peoples of their land rested upon constructed
concepts of “waste” and “crisis” that demonized First Nations land uses and
engineered a sense of urgency concerning the environment.[87]
Conservation was not a benevolent project, but a mechanism of social control
and modernization, benefitting commerce, rather than wildlife.[88]
Unconvincingly, Sandlos seems to suggest that this system was cohesive,
bordering on conspiratorial. This is unlikely, however, partly because the
state worked in tandem with other facets of society, enabling the social,
cultural, economic, and political wellbeing of white settlers.
Countering
Sandlos, Cole Harris notes that state discipline and surveillance were
sporadic, not totalizing. Although the state intended itself to be a totalizing
project, the violence of reorganizing land was not wholly a state project, with
individual settlers also implicated in imposing values and creating social and
geographic boundaries.[89]
Harris details the formation of a new human geography in British Columbia based
on prioritizing private property and agriculture.[90]
This land system was also, he argues, a “disciplinary appendage” of the state, underpinned
by a range of epistemological and regulatory practices.[91]
For example, the census was “an instrument of the growing regulatory power of
the modern nation-state” through which the state could subjugate Indigenous
peoples in the name of a “modern” project of researching the population.[92]
Harris also illustrates the intertwining of modernization and state formation
in the compression of distance through transportation and communication technologies.[93]
This was, according to Harris, part of a process of de-territorializing and
re-territorializing space in a new configuration, and a component of the
integration of British Columbia into a modernizing world. It was neither
politically nor culturally neutral.[94]
In this framing, Harris astutely emphasizes the mutually constitutive role of
colonialism and the nation-state in relation to land.
Gordon Stewart has argued that in Canada, business
and politics were integral to one another, reflecting a social and economic
reach of government unmatched in Britain or the United States. [95] This trend
is also apparent in “frontier” areas. Loo notes that the role of the Hudson’s
Bay Company in conservation in western Canada preceded government involvement;[96] taken together
with her analysis of governance and legal infrastructure under the Hudson’s Bay
Company during the fur trade era, it is clear that corporations have been
intertwined in processes of state formation. In The Politics of Development, H.V. Nelles similarly considers the relationship between business and the
state. He outlines the involvement of the Ontario provincial government in late
nineteenth and early twentieth century staples industries, arguing that the
province’s business-oriented strategy to development resulted in the Ontario
government becoming essentially a business client. Nelles particularly
considered how the intersection between politics and business reshaped and
potentially undermined principles of responsible government. Involvement with
staples resource industries became a test of ministerial accountability, where
politicians were forced to balance their business roles as shareholders with
their responsibility to constitutional process. This test of ministerial
judgment was often less than satisfactory, as the government privileged
business interests. Businesses based on staples industries could thus “use the
state to stabilize, extend, and legitimize their economic power.”[97] This was
particularly evident, Nelles argues, during the Depression, when industrialists
gained at the expense of other social groups, eroding the social sense of
responsible government.[98] Nelles
illustrates how “the public” was closely entwined with “the state” as he
discusses how, in the late nineteenth century, a concern about maintaining
“public” ownership of hydroelectric resources was equated with state ownership,
as a control against the “abuses of capitalism.”[99] In the
early twentieth century, despite questioning over the compatibility of business
interests and responsible government, this principle of public or state
ownership became limited, such that the association between politicians and
businessmen made the government responsible to resource industries.[100] Nelles
pessimistically concludes that the “politics of development” created a welfare
state, in which business were the primary beneficiaries.[101] This
corporate involvement was ongoing; Evenden argues that in the 1950s corporate
and provincial development goals coalesced, aiming to show Canadian capabilities
and an intangible sense of “progress.”[102]
This analysis illustrates how the complexities of
liberalism become increasingly complicated when placed in relief with
colonialism. State formation in Canada was not cohesive, but likely appeared
totalizing to those dispossessed by the expansion of a colonial state, as it
was extensive and multi-faceted. If not hegemonic, the liberal and colonial
underpinnings of the Canadian state are in a position approaching hegemony.
There appears to be a bizarre fusion of liberalism and republicanism in
Canadian state formation, in which a “modern” state values a “public” based on
liberal values. Gordon Stewart describes Canadian political parties as
“political dinosaurs” that cannot cope with twentieth century problems, as their
brains are disproportionately small compared to their political weight and
presence. [103] The
foundations of the Canadian state more broadly are similarly reptilian,
fragmented, circular, and paradoxical.
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[1] Ian McKay, “The
Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian
History,” Canadian Historical Review
81, no. 4 (December 2000): 621.
[2] McKay, 624.
[3] McKay, 631.
[4] McKay, 628.
[5] Tina Merrill Loo, Making
Law, Order, and Authority in British Columbia, 1821-1871, (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1994), 8,
159.
[6] Keith D. Smith, Liberalism,
Surveillances and Resistance: Indigenous Communities in Western Canada,
1877-1927, The West Unbound :
Social and Cultural Studies Series (Edmonton: AU Press, 2009), 12.
[7] Smith, 4, 7.
[8] Cecilia Louise
Morgan, Public Men and Virtuous Women: The Gendered Languages of Religion
and Politics in Upper Canada, 1791-1850, (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1996), 214.
[9] McKay, 624.
[10] McKay, 635-636.
[11] McKay, 644.
[12] McKay, 645.
[13] Smith, 12.
[14] Gordon T. Stewart, The
Origins of Canadian Politics: A Comparative Approach (Vancouver: University
of British Columbia Press, 1986), 3.
[15] Stewart, 20-23.
[16] Stewart, 30.
[17] Stewart, 1.
[18] Stewart, 61, 98-99.
[19] Stewart, 67, 90, 92-93.
[20] Stewart, 98.
[21] Stewart, 30.
[22] J. I. Little, State
and Society in Transition: The Politics of Institutional Reform in the Eastern
Townships, 1838-1852 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1997), 50.
[23] Little, 169, 170.
[24] Little, 175-185, 237.
[25] Allan Greer, The
Patriots and the People: The Rebellion of 1837 in Rural Lower Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 68, 88, 90, 100.
[26] Donald William Fyson,
Magistrates, Police and People: Everyday Criminal Justice in Quebec and
Lower Canada (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History,
University of Toronto Press, 2006), xiii.
[27] Fyson, 73, 202.
[28] Fyson, 308.
[29] Fyson, 218.
[30] Bruce Curtis, Building
the Educational State: Canada West, 1836-1871 (Barcombe, Lewes, East
Sussex: Falmer Press, 1988), 45, 84.
[31] Curtis, 51.
[32] Jeffrey L. McNairn, The
Capacity to Judge: Public Opinion and Deliberative Democracy in Upper Canada,
1791-1854 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 8.
[33] McNairn, 75-82.
[34] McNairn, 212.
[35] Morgan, 10, 182.
[36] Stewart, 57.
[37] Curtis, 15.
[38] McKay, 23.
[39] Curtis, 369.
[40] Curtis, 373.
[41] Little, 7, 12.
[42] Little, 238-239.
[43] Curtis, 45.
[44] Greer, 198, 205-206.
[45] Little, 165.
[46] For a sense of the complexity of Iroquois society,
see Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the
Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European
Colonization (Chapel Hill: Institute of Early American History and Culture,
University of North Carolina Press, 1992), Richard White, The Middle Ground:
Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815, 20th
anniversary ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), and Gail D.
MacLeitch, Imperial Entanglements: Iroquois Change and Persistence on the
Frontiers of Empire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).
Even “settlement” is problematic
terminology; Adele Perry argues that this “depoliticizes the process whereby
white people came to dominate First Nations territory” (Adele Perry, On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the
Making of British Columbia, 1849-1871 (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2001), 7). “Settler” here should
be considered as shorthand for settler-colonists, to acknowledge that this was
a colonial process with significant underlying power relations, even if the
people involved did not necessarily perceive their experiences in that fashion.
[47] McNairn, 219, 226.
[48] Curtis, 370.
[49] The term “frontier” here serves as shorthand for
regions somewhat removed from urban areas in central Canada where the white
settler state was implemented somewhat later. This is not, however, a neutral
term. See, for example, Phillip Deloria, “What is the Middle Ground, Anyway?” The William and Mary Quarterly 63(1).
[50] Adele Perry, On
the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849-1871
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 6, 14.
[51] Perry, 111.
[52] Perry, 99.
[53] Perry, 125.
[54] Perry, 127, 129.
[55] Perry, 173.
[56] Loo, Making
Law, 71.
[57] Loo, Making
Law, 3, 52-53.
[58] Loo, Making
Law, 75, 89.
[59] Loo, Making
Law, 92.
[60] Loo, Making
Law, 114.
[61] Loo, Making
Law, 114.
[62] McKay, 626.
[63] Loo, Making
Law, 114-115.
[64] Loo, Making
Law, 116-117.
[65] Loo, Making
Law, 131.
[66] Loo, Making
Law, 232.
[67] McKay, 640.
[68] Smith, 2.
[69] Smith, 15.
[70] Smith, 94, 131.
[71] Judith Raftery, Not
Part of the Public: Non-Indigenous Policies and Practices and the Health of
Indigenous South Australians 1836-1973 (Kent Town, South Australia:
Wakefield Press, 2006).
[72] Carl Berger, Science,
God, and Nature in Victorian Canada, The Joanne Goodman Lectures 1982
(Toronto ; Buffalo: University
of Toronto Press, 1983), 27.
[73] Tina Merrill Loo, States
of Nature: Conserving Canada’s Wildlife in the Twentieth Century, Nature,
History, Society (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), xvi.
[74] Loo, States of
Nature, xvi.
[75] Loo, States of
Nature, 6.
[76] Loo, States of
Nature, 40.
[77] Loo, States of
Nature, 136.
[78] Matthew D Evenden, Fish
versus Power: An Environmental History of the Fraser River (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 19.
[79] Evenden, 42.
[80] Evenden, 79.
[81] Evenden, 232, 264.
[82] John Sandlos, Hunters
at the Margins: Native People and Wildlife Conservation in the Northwest
Territories. (UBC Press, 2008), 13,
xix, 24.
[83] Sandlos, 45.
[84] Sandlos, 55, 76-77.
[85] Sandlos, 84.
[86] Sandlos, 139.
[87] Sandlos, 151-152, 196.
[88] Sandlos, 230, 233, 241.
[89] Cole Harris, The
Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change
(Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1997), 46,
65-68.
[90] Harris, 90.
[91] Harris, 101.
[92] Harris, 137.
[93] Harris, 193.
[94] Harris, 253, 162.
[95] Stewart, 84-85.
[96] Loo, States of
Nature, 94.
[97] H. V. Nelles, The
Politics of Development: Forests, Mines & Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario,
1849-1941, 2nd ed, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 427.
[98] Nelles, 487.
[99] Nelles, 306.
[100] Nelles, 382-383, 428.
[101] Nelles, 492.
[102] Evenden, 205.
[103] Stewart, 100.
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